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In many African countries, governments are re-thinking the role of the state in 
centrally providing certain goods and services.  The rights and responsibilities for 
providing various public goods are being decentralized to lower levels of government 
administration, and/or being devolved directly to local citizens or user groups themselves.  
It is thus critical to ask:  under what circumstances will local groups provide the socially 
optimal level of the public good?  In this paper, we apply this question to the case of 
controlling an important vector-borne livestock disease in Uganda, trypanosomosis, 
which is transmitted by the tsetse fly.  We investigate the underlying epidemiology of 
transmission and different options for control, and the implications for group provision of 
control, within the framework of a game-theoretic model.  Results indicate that individual 
incentives to uptake tsetse and trypanosomosis control differ widely across different 
control methods.  Since the costs of successfully implementing collective action are 
affected by individual incentives to participate in collective action, the model predicts 
which method/s are likely to be successfully implemented at the community level.  More 
broadly, the model highlights under what circumstances community-provision is not 
likely to be optimal, depending on the underlying epidemiology of the disease, 
technological parameters, prevailing market characteristics, and socio-cultural conditions.   
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Tsetse-transmitted trypanosomosis in Africa is a serious constraint to both animal 
agriculture and human health. Trypanosomosis of cattle, due to tsetse-transmitted 
Trypanosoma congolense, T. vivax and T. brucei occurs widely in sub Saharan Africa 
(SSA). Estimates of the land area affected range from approximately 8 ￿ 11 million 
square kilometers, inhabited by 260-300 million people and 45-50 million cattle. 
Estimates of total losses due to trypanosomosis range from USD 1.3 ￿ 5 billion 
depending on the methodology used, assumptions made, and type of loss estimated. 
Swallow (1997) estimates that each year in SSA, milk and meat offtake are 10-40% 
lower due to trypanosomosis infections, and that cattle numbers would increase by 37% 
in sub humid and 70% in humid zones if trypanosomosis were to be eradicated. He also 
concludes that in countries with large areas affected by trypanosomosis, total agricultural 
production is reduced by 2-10% (the crude relationship is that a 50% increase in livestock 
numbers would increase total agricultural output by 10%).  In humans, the United 
Nations (UN Wire, 2000) estimates there may be as many as 300,000 new cases (tenfold 
higher than reported cases) of human trypanosomosis (sleeping sickness) annually among 
the 45 million rural Africans at risk. 
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There are a number of tsetse and trypanosomosis control options, including large-
scale aerial and ground spraying of insecticides, sterile insect techniques, use of 
trypanotolerant livestock breeds, use of insecticides directly applied to livestock (in the 
form of pour-ons or sprays), use of odor-baited traps and/or pesticide treated targets, and 
the use of trypanocidal drugs (chemotherapy and chemo prophylaxis).  Large-scale 
spraying campaigns have largely been terminated because of serious adverse 
environmental and potential human health effects; sterile insect techniques are fairly new 
and require implementation at a very large-scales and thus very large outlays.  
Trypanotolerant livestock may be promoted at the community level and adopted by 
individuals; but to date, there are very few trypanotolerant cattle in southeastern Uganda
4.  
In this paper, we consider the latter three control strategies, which can be adopted at 
either the community or individual level: trypanocidal drugs, tsetse control/eradication 
using insecticidal pour-ons or sprays, and tsetse control/eradication using insecticidal 
targets and traps. 
These control methods have various advantages and disadvantages. Trypanocidal 
drugs are the most widely used treatment and control measure applied by individual 
farmers. Total expenditure on trypanocides in sub-Saharan Africa has been estimated at 
between USD 12 and 35 million per year, or between 30 ￿ 87 million doses (Sones, 1999; 
Kristjanson et al., 1999). The three common trypanocidal compounds (isometamidium, 
diminazene and homidium) have been used in cattle for more than 30 years and represent 
40%, 33% and 26% of the market respectively.  One disadvantage to drug use is 
                                                 
4 Generally speaking, trypanotolerant cattle species have been identified and studied in West and Central 
Africa (D￿Ietern et al., 1998), though others argue that certain east African breeds are also trypanotolerant 
(Dolan, 1998).  The breeds generally found in our study area are not, however, considered to be 




resistance, a problem which has been reported from many countries. Recent surveys 
conducted by the International Livestock Research Institute and its partners have shown a 
high proportion of resistant trypanosomes under circumstances of high trypanosomosis 
risk and trypanocidal drug use (Ethiopia > 90%; Burkina Faso, Kenya, Tanzania > 50%).   
Another disadvantage to drugs is the relatively small impact drug use appears to have on 
reducing overall prevalence (McDermott & Coleman, 2001).    
Insecticidal pour-ons and sprays applied to individual animals protect the 
individual animal from trypanosomosis and from other biting fly/tick diseases, and also 
have a relatively large impact on tsetse mortality and thus on overall prevalence of the 
disease.  There are thus private and public benefits to the use of pour-ons. Disadvantages 
include the relatively high costs of pour-ons needed to treat animals, and potential free-
riding behavior due to the positive externalities in use
5. Finally, stationary odor-baited 
traps or pesticide-treated targets (hereafter referred to as traps/targets) can be placed 
throughout a geographic area (based on tsetse distribution and human/livestock 
movements) to increase tsetse mortality and reduce prevalence of trypanosomosis.   Traps 
and targets appear to be the most efficacious in reducing prevalence, but benefits are a 
pure public good; there are no private benefits in the form of individual animals protected 
nor are there benefits from reducing other biting fly and/or tick diseases.  To date, almost 
all community-based traps/targets projects have been supported by external agents 
(governments, donors, Non-Governmental Organizations) with varying degrees of 
community participation, while the distribution of pour-ons have been supported by 
projects or paid for by individual farmers.  
                                                 
5 There may also be negative environmental externalities of using pour-ons, when cattle leave pour-on 
residues on fauna immediately following treatment.  We do not explore this potential externality further in 




Given these multiple control options, it is important to compare relative returns to 
guide trypanosomosis control decision-making.  This is particularly important at the 
present time since, under the current ￿development￿ paradigm of devolution and 
decentralization of responsibilities to the local level, national governments are 
retrenching from activities in tsetse control and/or donor-sponsored initiatives are 
focusing explicitly on community-based strategies for tsetse and tryps control (Brightwell 
et al., 2001).   In this climate, it is worth taking a close look at the underlying incentive 
structure for individuals in a community to cooperate in, or deviate from, agreements to 
provide various control methods.  To do so, we develop an economic model based on an 
underlying epidemiological model of trypanosomosis (McDermott & Coleman, 2001).  
Because in the current policy environment the emphasis is on community-based measures 
of tsetse and trypanosomosis control, we derive the social optimum level of traps/targets, 
pour-ons, and drug use and compare these with outcomes arising from a non-cooperative 
game.  It is particularly important to highlight the difference between the social optimum 
and outcomes arising from a non-cooperative game, as this difference is likely to reflect 
the cost of making and enforcing agreements on tsetse and trypanosomosis control at the 
community level. 
In section 2, we develop the basic maximization model for the social optimizer 
and the individual, and highlight the role of the underlying epidemiology of 
trypanosomosis (hereafter referred to as tryps).  In section 3, we derive the levels of traps 
and targets obtained under the social optimum and the non-cooperative game; we do the 
same for pour-ons in section 4, and for drug use in section 5.  In the basic model, we 




extend the model to allow for a non-cooperative game to be played over the use of 
common pastures as well as in the provision of tsetse and/or tryps control measure.  
Section 7 summarizes the results and discusses the implications for current policy 
measures, and section 8 concludes. 
 
2.  THE BASIC MODEL 
2.1   BASIC ECONOMIC MODEL FOR THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE SOCIAL 
OPTIMIZER 
We start by considering the individual￿s maximization problem.  The basic 
maximization model is written as follows: 
() () () () () ( ) ()
, max 1 * 1 *
ii
ii i O D i i H T r y p H i i c m i x i xc m T cm k T cm P CM k P CM R x c cm c x π   =+ − + − − −    
           [ 1 ]  
() ; 1 . . ≤ CM P t s H     () ; 1 ≤ i i cm T  
The first term,  i T , gives the proportion of animals that have been directly treated 
in the herd of person i, with control method,  i cm .  The proportion of untreated animals is 
given by() 1 i T − , and here we also assume that all untreated animals will suffer a 
proportionate reduction in output from ￿other diseases￿, the proportionate reduction 
being captured by  OD k .   In other words, treatment in the above representation protects 
the animals from both other diseases and trypanosomosis (hereafter referred to as tryps) 
simultaneously.  The fraction of untreated that remain healthy of tryps is given by  H P , 
and the fraction of untreated animals that become infected is given by () 1 H P − .  




reduction in output equal to  Tryp k .  In the above formulation, both the fraction treated and 
the fraction of untreated animals that become infected with tryps may be functions of the 
total amount of the control method used in the community,  ∑ = i cm CM .   In other 
words, the control method may increase the proportion of healthy animals in the herd 
directly through treatment, and indirectly, by reducing infection prevalence and thus 
reducing the proportion of untreated animals that become infected
6.   
() X Ri  is gross revenue product (output price times total production), where X  is 
the total number of livestock held.   In the above specification, healthy animals simply 
provide gross returns of  () X Ri , and sick animals provide a fraction of the gross returns of 
healthy animals (c.f. Romney et al. 1995, Swallow, 2001).  Costs of the control method 
and of animals are assumed to be constant, and are denoted by  cm c  and  X c , respectively.    
 
In contrast to the individual￿s maximization problem, below is the basic 
maximization problem for the social optimizer: 
() () () () () () ()
, max 1 * 1 *
ii
ii i O D i i H H i i c m i x i Tryp xc m
i
T cm k T cm P CM k P CM R x c cm c x π   =+ − + − − −    ∑
 
() ; 1 . . ≤ CM P t s H     () ; 1 ≤ i i cm T  
 
2.2  BASIC EPIDEMIOLOGICAL MODEL  
In order to solve for the optimal amount of control measure to provide for either 
the social optimizer or the individual, we need to have a model of the equilibrium 
infection prevalence and how control measures affect that prevalence.   We borrow 
                                                 
6 Certain control methods, i.e. tsetse traps and targets, directly reduce tsetse numbers but there is no direct 




heavily from an equilibrium prevalence model proposed in McDermott and Coleman 
(2001), which itself is based on the Ross-Macdonald framework for malaria transmission 
modified by Rogers (1988) to incorporate basic features of tsetse-transmitted 
trypanosomosis.    The equilibrium prevalence is derived from a dynamic transmission 
model; in this paper we will only be concerned with evaluating equilibrium prevalence 
and not the dynamic path of transmission.  Below we present the equilibrium tsetse 
reproductive ratio, designated by  0 R , which captures the number of secondary infections 










where u is the tsetse mortality rate, T is the incubation period required for the 
parasite to mature in tsetse fly, cis the probability of a susceptible animal becoming 
infected from biting an infectious fly, ais the daily biting rate of flies, b is the probability 
of a fly becoming infected from an infected cow, m is the ratio of tsetse flies to host 
animals, and 1/r is the duration of infection in cattle.    The equilibrium prevalence of the 














If we assume that all infected animals become sick, so that the proportion sick is 


















2 ca b ϕ =  and rinv=1/r, substituting for  0 R  in the above expression, 










In the next three sections, we consider the impact of alternative control measures 
on infection prevalence and on the number of treated animals.   As discussed in the 
introduction, there are three types of control measures considered in turn in this paper: 
traps and targets, pour-ons, and trypanocidal drugs.  Traps and targets have no impact on 
the number of treated animals, but do increase the proportion of healthy animals by 
reducing prevalence via an increase u, the tsetse mortality rate, and it may also reduce the 
fly:host ration, m
7.  The use of pour-ons, like traps and targets, increases the tsetse 
mortality rate and may reduce m.  However, there is an additional direct impact from 
using pour-ons, which is the increase in the number of treated animals.  Trypanocidal 
drug use directly increases the number of treated animals, but we assume that there are no 
direct impacts on equilibrium prevalence
8.    
While all models are built on simplifying assumptions, we note here that a major 
simplifying assumption in this model is that the number of treated cattle does not have a 
direct impact on equilibrium prevalence.  That is, whereas we allow fly density to change 
with a reduction in the number of flies, we assume that it does not change with decreases 
in the number of susceptible cattle.  This assumption might be reasonable for cases where 
                                                 
7In the next section, we will first consider the impact of traps and targets when there is no additional impact 
on fly densities, and consider this to represent the case where reinvasion from surrounding areas occurs 
each period (McDermott & Coleman, 2001).  Allowing for an impact on fly:vector ratio captures the case 
where reinvasion does not occur, or does so incompletely.   
8As noted above, empirically there seems to be little benefit from drug use in terms of reduced prevalence 




there are many host species, where the marginal impact on fly densities might reasonably 
be considered to be zero or close to zero.  This is done so that we can highlight decisions 
on both the optimal choice of the control measure to apply and the optimal number of 
livestock to hold.  Incorporating this additional possible impact would significantly 
complicate evaluating the non-cooperative game outcomes, and such an extension would 
require numerical simulation. 
 
3.  PROVISION OF TRAPS AND TARGETS 
We first evaluate the impact of traps and targets on tsetse mortality rate, u; to do 
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Equations 2 and 3 above imply that the proportion of healthy animals may very 




of the implications of the sign of equation 3 for the shape of the overall profit function, 
we are interested in characterizing the conditions under which equation 3 is positive.  A 




< .     This ratio, 
ac
u
, has been termed the ￿stability￿ index (MacDonald, 1957); 
basically, when the ratio is greater than 1, disease is characterized by ￿good 
transmission￿, so that prevalence is relatively stable and robust to ￿shocks￿.  When the 
ratio is less than one, prevalence is characterized as unstable, and the disease is more 
likely to disappear if the system is subject to shocks.  Thus in areas with fluctuating 
disease prevalence, returns to control methods might be increasing at an increasing rate, 
which is quite intuitive.   
 
Consider next an additional impact of traps/targets via a reduction in the fly:host 
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with second derivative: 
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Given that a control method will always reduce the fly:host ratio, the above 




Thus, if the control method has a separate impact on m, it is more likely that the profit 
function is convex, ceteris paribus. 
 
Given these basic epidemiological relations, we can now return to the 
maximization problem.  Denoting the use of traps and targets by person i as  tt i cm − , and 




i tt tt cm CM ,we re-write the basic 
maximization problems as follows:   
 
()() () ( ) ()
, max 1 * 1 *
tt
it t i
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To simplify notation in this next section, we note that traps/targets do not affect 
the number of treated animals, and rewrite the maximization problem setting  0 i T = : 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
, max 1 *
tt
it t i
iO D H t t T r y p H t t i i c m t t i x i xc m k P CM k P CM R x c cm c x π
−
−  =+ − − −   
 
We initially assume that gross livestock revenue is a function of only the 
individual￿s own herd.  This assumption might reflect a situation where stocking rates are 
relatively light, or where animals are kept on private fields and/or grass is cut and carried.  




over grazing pressure on a common pasture as well as in the provision of a 
trypanosomosis control. 
Considering first the case where traps/targets have an impact only on tsetse 
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The social optimizer (SO), on the other hand, considers the effect of an increase 
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the SO problem may be written as: 
 
() () ( ) ()
, max 1 *
it t i
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() 1 . . ≤ tt H cm P t s  
which gives the following first-order conditions: 
() *1 * 0
i H
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For traps and targets, then, we have the standard pure public good result where the 
individual only considers the marginal benefits from the public good accruing to 
him/herself as captured in Eq [6], whereas the social optimizer considers the impact of an 
increase in the control measure by any individual household on all households, as 
captured in Eq [8]. As derived in appendix 1, the amount of the control method provided 
is always higher under the social optimum.  And, because the difference between the non-
cooperative outcome and the social optimum is the sum of marginal benefits accruing to 
other members, this difference increases with the number of members (also proved in 
appendix 1).  Given that prevalence is lower and proportion healthy animals is higher 
under the social optimum, the optimal number of animals to stock is clearly higher under 
the social optimum, as can easily be seen by examining equations [7] & [9].   It is worth 
emphasizing that more animals are stocked under the social optimum than under non-
cooperation because of the assumption that the production function is only a function of 
each individual￿s own herd size and other household-specific parameters.  Thus there are 
no implications to be drawn here about ￿overgrazing￿, since there are no externalities in 
use of pastures at this stage. 
 
The above results define a unique interior solution only when the second order 
conditions for a maximum hold, and so we next consider the conditions under which the 
second-order condition holds. We make the standard assumption that livestock 


































However these assumptions are not enough to ensure that the profit function is quasi-






, which can be greater than zero as shown 
above.  
Though somewhat tedious to show, the profit function is quasi-concave whenever 
the second derivative of profits with respect to traps/targets is negative
9. The second 



































While the second term is negative, the sign of the first term may be positive, and 
thus the sign of the entire term is indeterminate.  Intuitively, for the term to be negative, 
an increase in mortality due to an increase in traps or targets must be decreasing at a 
sufficiently decreasing rate to more than offset the change in prevalence as mortality 
increases.  Or, reductions in changes in mortality due to the last few traps/targets must be 
much lower than gains accruing to the first traps/targets.  If this condition is not met, then 
the first-order conditions will then define a minimum.   
 
                                                 
9 The condition is based on the Hessian, and is explicitly derived in Appendix 2.   We also note here that, if 
the only choice variable were the traps/target level, the matrix of second derivatives for the system of 
equations for both the non-cooperative game and the social optimum would equal zero, and whether or not 




Furthermore, consider an additional impact on overall prevalence due to a 
reduction in the fly densities as use of traps/targets increases.  The first order condition 
with respect to traps and targets for the individual then becomes: 
() 1
i HH
OD Tryp i cm
tt i tt i tt i
Pu Pm
kk R c
cm u cm m cm
π
−− −
 ∂ ∂∂ ∂∂
=+ − =  ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
  [10] 












.  Clearly, the first order condition is greater when there is an additional 
impact on the fly densities; this is true for both the non-cooperative game and the social 
optimizer.   Also, since the proportion healthy increases at an increasing rate as fly 
densities decrease, the second derivative is always greater when there is an additional 
impact on fly densities, and is thus more likely to be positive, all else equal. 
 We can now ask how the nature of the underlying epidemiology shapes 
individual incentives to adopt traps/targets.  There are two aspects to the problem that 
complicate the evaluation of the externalities generated and thus the underlying incentive 
structure.  First, the fact that the proportion of healthy cattle is bounded above at 1 means 
that we must consider corner solutions.  Even if the profit function is everywhere 
concave, the game structure may be ￿fully privileged￿.  This would mean that under the 
non-cooperative game, the unique equilibrium provision level is greater than or equal to 
that level for which the proportion healthy equals 1 (hereafter referred to as full 
provision). Because the socially optimal level of control is always greater than that under 
non-cooperation, the social optimum would also be at the corner solution of full 
provision.  It is also possible that the social optimum is at the corner of full provision but 




the social optimum is always greater than the non-cooperative solution.  Finally, both the 
social optimum and non-cooperative outcomes may be at an interior level of provision 
below full provision.  In these latter two cases, the underlying incentive structure can be 
characterized as a prisoner￿s dilemma, where the unique equilibrium level of provision 
under the non-cooperative game is less than that arising under the social optimum.  Thus, 
given that the profit function is concave, the underlying game structure might be 
characterized either as fully privileged or as a prisoner￿s dilemma.  
The second complication arises because the profit function may also be convex, at 
least over some range.  In this case, there are many of possible game structures that might 
arise, including a ￿chicken game￿, an assurance game, a prisoner￿s dilemma, or a fully 
￿not￿ privileged game.  With sufficiently low costs of providing traps/targets, each 
individual will find it in his/her best interest to fully provide the traps/targets if the other 
person does not provide any, but is clearly better off if the other person fully provides 














tt is that level of traps/targets such that  H P (CM
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∑ is the total 
amount of the traps/targets provided by all other players besides player i. There are no 
gains to increasing CM tt  above this level since benefits will not increase but costs will.  
The underlying incentive structure in this case resembles a chicken game.  This means 
that if the other fully provides the CM
*
tt , then you prefer to provide 0, but if the other 
player puts on 0, you prefer to fully provide CM
*
tt .  As costs increase, the individual 




increasing returns to scale, the person still does better at providing ‰ CM
*
tt  when the 
other person provides ‰ CM
*
tt , so that the underlying incentive structure resembles an 
assurance game.  As costs increase still further, the individual￿s best response to the other 
person￿s provision level is always not to provide any traps/targets; that is no matter if the 
other person provides zero or ‰ CM
*
tt  -- or anything in between ￿ the first person￿s best 
response is to provide zero.  As long as costs are not too high, however, the social 
optimum is still to fully provide the good, so that the underlying incentive structure is 
characterized by a prisoner￿s dilemma.  Finally, costs can be high enough so that no 
provision is optimal for either the social optimizer or non-cooperating individuals.   
The above results are quite interesting, but perhaps a bit difficult to visualize.  In 
Figure 1, we illustrate two cases that may arise when profits are concave; the case where 
the social optimum is to fully provide traps/targets but where the non-cooperative game 
outcome leads to less than full provision, and the case where both the social optimal 
amount and the non-cooperative outcome are below full provision.  To generate the 
graphs, we increase the constant marginal cost of the control method, which does not 
affect  () H tt PC M, meaning that full provision is reached at the same 
*
tt CM  in every 
scenario, facilitating comparison across scenarios.  The y-axis measures profits accruing 
to player 1, which are a function of the level of his/her control method provided,  1 − tt cm , 
measured on the x-axis.  Profits to player 1, however, also depend on the level of 
traps/targets provided by player 2,  2 − tt cm .  Thus, profit curves are generated under three 




2 − tt cm = ‰ 
*
tt CM , which is equal to 75 for the parameters used to generate this graph
10, 
and 3)  1 − tt cm = 2 − tt cm .  The line denoted as ￿Profits 1,  2 − tt cm =0￿ gives the profits accruing 
to player 1 for different levels of  1 − tt cm  assuming that player 2 does not provide any 
traps/targets; this curve captures the change in player 1￿s profits as he increases  1 − tt cm  
when player 2 is a free-riding.  The line denoted as ￿Profits 1,  2 − tt cm =‰ 
*
tt CM ￿ captures 
the change in player 1￿s profits assuming that player 2 plays the social optimum.  In a 
sense this curve gives the incentives of player 1 to cheat; the point where this curve takes 
a maximum along the relevant range is player 1￿s optimal response to  2 − tt cm =75.  Note, 
however, that the optimal response may well be  1 − tt cm =75; in this case, incentives to 
cheat would be zero.  The line denoted as ￿Profits,  2 − tt cm = 1 − tt cm ￿, gives the profits 
accruing to player 1 assuming that both players always use the same amount of the 
control; this curve then represents returns from enforcing joint behavior as assumed under 
the social optimizer￿s problem.   These three curves enable us to highlight incentives to 
cooperate, incentives to cheat, and incentives to not be taken advantage of by a free-rider.   
Finally, we generate these three curves for two different marginal cost levels; the solid 
line representing the lower marginal costs.  
                                                 



















Given the concave production function, incentives to free ride are everywhere 
decreasing the player 1￿s own provision level; in other words, if player 2 provide ‰ 
*
tt CM , the player 1￿s best response is to not provide any traps/targets; this is true for both 
of the costs levels illustrated above.  Profits when player 2 does not provide any 
traps/targets are at first increasing and then decreasing; the maximum is reached at a 
lower level of  1 − tt cm  in the higher cost case.  Finally, profits from cooperating, i.e. when 
1 − tt cm = 2 − tt cm , are also increasing  1 − tt cm + 2 − tt cm , but in the lower cost case, they are 
highest when  1 − tt cm = 2 − tt cm =75, whereas there is an internal solution of about 22 as costs 
increase.   
Turning now to the case where the profit function is convex, Figure 2 plots each 
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As in the previous figure, incentive lines shift downward as costs increase.  
Starting at very low marginal costs, the underlying incentive structure resembles a 
chicken game, where full provision is still the only equilibrium outcome.   This result is 
captured in the fact that both the incentives to increase provision (red lines) and the 
incentives when player 2 does not provide any of the good (yellow lines) are strictly 
increasing, and take their maximum at the highest relevant  1 − tt cm .  As costs increase, the 
range of equilibria increase to encompass full provision, no provision, and any total 
provision level in between -- that is, an assurance game structure.  Here, there are no 
incentives to free ride since profits when  2 − tt cm =‰ 
*
tt CM , are highest when  1 − tt cm =‰ 
*
tt CM , as before.  However, there are no incentives to provide more when player 2 free 
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as costs increase further still, both the curves for  2 − tt cm =‰ 
*
tt CM  and for  2 − tt cm =0 take a 
maximum at zero ￿ indicating that there are both incentives to free ride and also 
incentives not to be taken advantage of (as when player 2 free rides); this means that the 
underlying game structure resembles a prisoner￿s dilemma.  In this case, there will be no 
provision under the non-cooperative game.  However, the social optimum is always to 
fully provide traps and targets as captured in the blue lines.    
To conclude this section, we note that, because of the underlying epidemiology of 
trypanosomosis, there is a wide range of possible results under both a social optimum as 
well as under a non-cooperative game.  If the profit function is concave, then provision of 
traps/targets will be lower when individuals do not cooperate except at a corner solution 
of full provision.  With an interior solution and concave profit function, the underlying 
incentive structure resembles a prisoner￿s dilemma and there is a unique level of 
provision.  If the profit function is convex, then the incentive structure underlying the 
non-cooperative game may take any form ￿ resembling a chicken game, assurance game, 
or prisoner￿s dilemma.  
It seems reasonable to assume that, under a chicken game structure, full provision 
should always result, but coordination might be important.  Providing a public good 
where the underlying structure resembles an assurance game will be more costly than 
ensuring full provision under a chicken game structure, but should also be less costly than 
providing such a good when the underlying incentive structure resembles a prisoner￿s 
dilemma, all else equal (McCarthy et al., 2001).  So, the question arises as to what 
conditions are more likely to lead to a fully privileged game than to a prisoner￿s dilemma.  




intuitive results that a higher number of traps/targets will be maintained the lower are 
constant marginal costs, the greater is total revenue product, the lower are proportionate 
losses due to other diseases, the lower are proportionate losses due to other infections, the 
greater the marginal impact of traps/targets on mortality, and, for the most part, the 
greater is prevalence in the absence of any treatment
11.   On the other hand, when the 
profit function is convex, we are interested in changes in exogenous variables that shift 
the minimum towards the origin.  The comparative statics are thus essentially the same; 
the Hessian is now positive, but we are evaluating changes that shift the minimum 
towards the origin.  Thus, starting from very low costs and a chicken game structure, 
increasing costs causes the game structure to move to an assurance game, then to a 
prisoner￿s dilemma, and finally to a situation where neither the social optimizer nor the 
individuals provide any traps/targets.  Similarly, starting from relatively high total 
revenue, decreasing total revenue leads to the same procession through the game 
structures, etc. 
4.  POUR-ONS  
The basic model as developed above for traps and targets applies to pour-ons 
since the effect of this control method is also to increase tsetse mortality rates.  However, 
in this case, there are also two direct impacts on the health of animals in the individual￿s 
own herd ￿ the number of animals treated for trypanosomosis increases and the number 
of animals treated for other tick or biting fly transmitted diseases also increases.    For 
simplicity, we assumed in section 2 above that all animals not treated become infected 
with other biting fly/tick diseases.  The specification also implies that animals infected 
                                                 




with tryps also suffer an additional loss due to other biting diseases.  Using  po i cm −  to 
denote the use of pour-on by individual i, the maximization problem can be written a 
follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) () () () ()
, max 1 * 1
ip o i
i i po i OD i po i H H i i cm po i x i Tryp xc m Tc m k Tc m P C M k P C M Rx cc m c x π
−
−− −   =+ − + − − −   
() .. 1 ; Hp o stP CM ≤     () 1; ip o i Tc m− ≤  
The major difference with the traps and targets problem is that the proportion of 
treated animals is directly affected by the use of pour-ons.  As with the case with traps 
and targets, there is also an additional impact on proportion of untreated animals that 
remain healthy, H P , which is also a function of the level of pour-on use.    First-order 
conditions for the individual are as follows: 
() () () () () () 11 * 1 1 * 0
ii H
OD i Tryp OD H Tryp H i po
po i po i po i
T Pu
kT k k P k P R c
cm u cm cm
π
−− −
     ∂∂ ∂∂
 =− − + − + − − =     ∂∂ ∂ ∂        
 [11] 
() () () () () () ( )
1* 1
ii i
i p oi O D i p oi H H x Tryp
i i
Rx




∂   =+ − + − −    ∂ ∂
 [12] 
We can now compare the first-order conditions for traps and targets vs. those for 
pour-ons under the non-cooperative game.  Recall that the FOCs for traps and targets are 
as follows: 
() *1 * 0
i H
od Tryp i cm











OD H Tryp H x
ii
R
kP k P c
xx
π ∂∂   =+ − − =   ∂∂
 [14] 
If the marginal cost of traps and targets were equal to marginal costs of pour-ons 





















, then an individual would certainly prefer to use only pour-ons, 
because of the gains from animals treated for both trypanosomosis and other diseases; 
gains that accrue to the individual from the use of pour-ons that do not occur with the use 
of traps and targets (compare equations 11 and 13).    However, it is not likely that either 
marginal costs or marginal reductions in mortality are likely to be the same for the two 
control methods; we return to this issue when we the conditions under which one control 
method would be preferred to another, in the discussion section below.   
The social optimizer￿s problem may be written as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) () () () ()
, max 1 * 1
ip o i
i i po i OD i po i H H i i cm po i x i Tryp xc m Tc m k Tc m P C M k P C M Rx cc m c x π
−
−− −   =+ − + − − −    ∑
( ) .. 1 ; Hp o stP CM ≤     ( ) 1; ip o i Tc m− ≤  
With FOC￿s: 
() () () () 1* 1 * 1 * 0
i i H
OD Trp OD H Tryp H i po
po i po i po i
T Pu
kT k P k P R c
cm u cm cm
π
−− −
     ∂∂ ∂∂
 =− + − + −− =     ∂∂ ∂ ∂        
∑  [15] 
() () () () () () ( )
1* 1
ii i
i p oi O D i p oi H H x Tryp
i i
Rx
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 [16] 
Similar to the comparison of first-order conditions for traps and targets, we see 
that the FOC with respect to pour-ons is greater for the SO vs. NC when evaluating the 
expressions at the same  , ii cm x  pair.  Following a very similar proof to that shown in 
Appendix 1 for the case of traps/targets, it can easily be shown that pour-ons and head of 
livestock are both greater under the social optimum vs. the non-cooperative game 




As with the case of examining traps and targets, the pour-on technology may also 
lead to convex production function; therefore, the same range of possible paired 
outcomes as with traps and targets may prevail so we do not repeat them here.    
The multiplicity of possible scenarios makes comparing across the control 
methods difficult, but certain results can be highlighted.  Clearly, the more important are 
other diseases, the more likely pour-ons will be preferred to traps or targets by either the 
social optimizer or a group of non-cooperating individuals.  On the other hand, traps and 
targets may well be preferred by the social optimizer at the same time (or rather, under 
the same parameter values) that pour-ons are preferred by individuals operating under a 


















, when  Tryp OD kk > , and when the number of members is relatively large.   
 
5.  PREVENTATIVE AND CURATIVE DRUG USE 
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The second derivative is as follows: 



























It is important to remember that drug use will decrease the duration of infection in 




healthy as r-inv decreases.   Given the relationships specified in equations 17 & 18, 
reducing the duration of infection increases the proportion healthy at an increasing rate.  
Whereas with traps, targets, and pour-ons, it is possible that the prevalence/ tsetse 
mortality relationship exhibits increasing marginal returns, with trypanocidal drugs the 
prevalence/infection duration relationship always exhibits increasing marginal returns.    
Nonetheless, whether or not the overall profit function is concave or convex will depend 







, where  D cm  is the trypanocidal drug control method.  
Drugs also have a direct effect on the number of animals protected from tryps, but 
these treated animals will not be protected from other diseases. For simplicity, above we 
assumed that treated animals were simultaneously protected against tryps and other 
diseases, but here, we will consider that all animals lose the constant fraction,  od k  
whether treated or not, so that  i T  refers to the proportion of treated animals that are 
protected from tryps only.  Because the optimization problem is similar to those above, 
we simply provide the first-order conditions for the non-cooperative game below: 
() () () () () 1* 1 * 1 1 * 0
i i H
OD i Tryp H Tryp H i po
DD D
T Pr i n v
kTk P kP R c
cm rinv cm cm
π      ∂∂ ∂∂
=− − + − + − − =     ∂∂ ∂ ∂      
 [19] 
() () () () () () ( )
1* 1
ii i
OD i D i D H H x Tryp
i i
Rx
k T cm T cm P CM k P CM c
xx
π ∂   =+ − + − −    ∂∂
 [20] 
Because curative drugs do not affect other diseases, equations [19] & [20] are 
lower than [11] & [12], all else equal.  But, all else is not likely to be equal.  As noted in 
the introduction, empirically, the impact of drugs on prevalence appears to be quite 
limited, so most of the value of drug use will be in shifting animals into the ￿treated￿ 




treat the same animals against other diseases, so that pour-ons should be preferred to 
preventative use of drugs, unless costs of drugs are much lower.   
Next, consider curative use of drugs.  In this case, one only spends the resources 
to treat an animal if that animal actually comes down with the tryps.   In this case, all 
animals are susceptible, i.e.  i T =0.   
() () () ()
, max 1
iD
iO DH H i i c m D x i Tryp xc m kP C M k P C MR x c c m c x π   =+ − − −   
 
() .. 1 HD stP CM ≤  
Taking the derivative with respect to curative drugs, and recalling that drugs will 
only be used on those animals becoming sick yields the following first-order: 
() 11 0
i H
OD Tryp Tryp D
DD
Pr i n v
kk k c
cm rinv cm
π    ∂ ∂∂  =− + − − =     ∂∂ ∂    
     [ 2 1 ]  
To compare with preventative drug use, we rewrite the first-order condition in 







=1, we have the following  
() () () () () 1* 1 1 1 * 0
i H
OD i Tryp H Tryp H i po
DD
Pr i n v
kTk P kP R c
cm rinv cm
π    ∂ ∂∂  =− − + − + − − =     ∂∂ ∂    
 [22] 
Comparing the first terms in square brackets in each of the two equations, we note 








−   ∂∂  
 >  () () 1* 1
H
iT r y p
D
Pr i n v
Tk
rinv cm
   ∂∂
−−    ∂∂   
.  Similarly, 
comparing the terms in the second square brackets, we note that  1 Tryp k   −   > 
() () () 11 HT r y p H Pk P  −+ −  .   Thus, the first-order condition with respect to drug use is 
greater for preventative vs. curative use, and thus, given the choice ￿ and the assumptions 




Also, the lower the prevalence, the more valuable it is not to treat until the animal 
becomes sick ￿ and thus the more likely curative drug use will be preferred to pour-ons.  
Again, however, this would be more likely in areas where other diseases were of minor 
importance.   
A major assumption in the above model is that any infection is immediately 
diagnosed and can be treated immediately.  If there is a probability that a correct 
diagnosis won￿t be made and/or that drugs will not be available when needed, then 
clearly expected marginal benefits of waiting to cure will be reduced.  Thus, to the extent 
that diagnosis and access to drugs are unreliable, preventative drug use becomes more 
attractive.  
 
6.  NON-COOPERATION IN STOCKING DENSITIES AND CONTROL 
METHOD LEVELS: 
6.1  CONCAVE CONTROL METHOD FUNCTION: 
Above, we have assumed that livestock production is a function of the 
individual￿s own herd size only.  This assumption might reflect a situation where 
stocking rates are relatively light, where animals are kept on private fields and/or grass is 
cut and carried.  In the following section, we relax this assumption and allow for a non-
cooperative game to be played over grazing on common pasture, as well in the provision 
of a pure public good.  We first consider the case where returns to the control method are 

































To highlight the interdependency of livestock production on common-pool 


















j i x x f , is the average product function.  To 




j j x X , so that  ( ) ( ) j i i i X x f x X TP , = ; when convenient and 
clear, we simply use f  in place of  ( ) , ij f xX  We assume that the total product function 












We consider only the use of traps/targets in mathematical detail since, with this 
control method, we may let  i T =0 thereby considerably simplifying notation.  In this case, 
the individual￿s maximization problem is written as follows: 
() () () () ( ) max 1 * , i H tt H tt i i j CM tt i x i PC M k PC M x fx X cc m c x π − =+ − − −  
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The SO problem may be re-written as: 
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We note that the first-order conditions for both the social optimizer and the 
individual with respect to the control method are the same as in the previous section.  It 
can easily be shown that 
SO NC
HH PP >  in this extended problem, since there is no 
combination,
NC
i x , 
SO






























f  hold simultaneously
12.   
Defining () ( ) 1,    1
SO SO NC NC SO NC
HH HH Pk P Pk P φφ =+ − =+ −  and substituting this 
notation, we can rewrite the first-order conditions for NC and SO with respect to  i x  as 
follows: 
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∑  at the 
same  i x , which is the standard result of over-exploitation.  However, in 
                                                 









i x . The intuition is that the lower 
provision of the control method under non-cooperation may sufficiently lower profits 
(and marginal profits) so that fewer animals will be stocked despite the tendency to 
overstock induced by the negative externality in grazing.    
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∑
, when the expression is evaluated at the same 
, it t i x cm −  pair.   
Overstocking is more likely to result when both the difference between the control 
method provision levels, 
NC SO φ φ − , is relatively small, and optimal provision under the 
social optimum is relatively high.   It can also be shown that overstocking is more likely 
to result the greater is the negative externality, and the larger the number of players. 
To summarize this sub-section, and recalling that we have assumed that returns to 
the control method are concave, health inputs will always be lower when there is also 
non-cooperation in stock densities.  This is an important result that must be considered in 
communities where members rely on un-managed common pastures because incentives 
to adopt and/or increase provision of control measures will be lower. 
 
6.2  CONVEX CONTROL METHODS FUNCTION: 
When the control method function is convex, there are three possible paired 




control method but the non-cooperative outcome is to provide no control measures, and 
neither provide any control measures.  
If both provide the same level of the control measure ￿ either fully or none at all ￿ 
then stock densities will be higher and profits will be lower under non-cooperation.  
Mirroring the results from the section immediately above, if the social optimizer fully 
provides the control measure but the non-cooperative outcome is to provide none, then 
stock densities under non-cooperation may be equal, greater than or less than those 
obtaining at the social optimum.   
Nonetheless, the lower is the total product, the less likely it is that full provision 
will be chosen. To the extent that total profits are lower under non-cooperation, the less 
likely it will be that full provision is chosen, and the more likely it is that the incentive 
structure underlying the choice of provision levels will resemble a prisoner￿s dilemma 
type game, as discussed above. 
 
7.  DISCUSSION 
As captured in the plethora of possible scenarios presented above, the technical 
relationship between a control method and the response in prevalence is an empirical 
question.  However, we can still characterize under which conditions individuals are 
likely to provide and maintain traps/targets, or rather to use pour-ons or trypanocidal 
drugs.  Assuming that a community can without cost enforce the social optimum, the use 
of traps alone is more likely to occur when costs of pour-ons are very high, when the 
decrease in productivity resulting from non-trypanosomosis diseases is not very great (so 




when the marginal increase in tsetse mortality due to an increase in pour-ons is much 
smaller than the marginal reduction with traps and targets.   Using only pour-ons is more 
likely to be optimal when the decrease in productivity resulting from tryps is low 
compared to the decrease in productivity from other diseases, and when costs of 
maintaining traps are high. 
However, given non-cooperation in the provision of the public good, use of pour-
ons becomes much more attractive.  Even if there is only a slight impact of pour-ons on 
overall prevalence of tryps, as long as private returns are relatively high (other diseases 
important, gains in own productivity are relatively large (i.e.  OD k is relatively small)), 
then only pour-ons will be provided under a non-cooperative game.   Furthermore, as the 
number of members increases, it is even more likely that the social optimizer will prefer 
traps and targets.   As discussed in Brightwell et al. (2001), in the case where many 
members will benefit, a centralized authority for providing the traps and targets becomes 
essential ￿ though community members themselves must recognize the benefits and 
support the goals of the centralized institution.   
Non-cooperation in the number of animals to stock, e.g. if community members 
rely heavily on un-managed or imperfectly managed common property pastures as a 
source of forage for the animals, reduces the incentives to provide either pour-ons or 
traps and targets.  The marginal returns to any health input decrease with lower 
forage/feed productivity.  There has been some discussion as to the appropriate 
institutional structure of tsetse control programs in the semi-arid regions in East Africa; 
but to the extent that per animal productivity is lower, any type of control program is 




maintenance ￿ and it is quite possible in these areas that no provision is optimal even 
under a social optimum. 
Curative drug use may very well be the optimal and unique control strategy.  This 
is more likely to be true when:  prevalence of tryps itself is quite low, prevalence of other 
non-tryps diseases is relatively low, there is an additional negative impact on prevalence 
from curative drug use, pastures are private and/or there is little over-exploitation of 
common pool pastures, and cost of drugs is relatively low. 
No control of any kind is likely to be optimal when returns to animal production 
per se are relatively low.  Very low returns may be realized when there is a lot of 
overstocking and when output prices are low.   
Now that we￿ve reached the end of the discussion, it may seem that we have gone 
to a lot of trouble simply to verify what ought to have been common knowledge 
beforehand.  In fact, however, the incentive problems associated with the provision of 
alternative tsetse control methods are still probably not well enough appreciated.  While 
many experts view the provision of traps quite skeptically (c.f. Leak, 1998), another 
group believes that all one has to do is to get across to community members that 
providing traps is good for everyone (c.f. the discussion of this in Brightwell, et al. 2001).   
That is to say, many believe that the reason traps and targets have failed in the past is 
because the weren￿t ￿owned￿ by the community, that community participation was 
lacking, and that the top-down approach meant that traps and targets were likely to 
dilapidate rather quickly once project leaders and/or funding was stopped.  But, here we 
have shown that it is quite possible that the incentive structure to provide the traps and 




members to provide such a good.  More importantly, it will be even more costly ￿ if not 
impossible ￿ for a community to provide traps and targets when community members 
also rely on un-managed common pastures as the major feed source.  Despite much 
discussion of ￿devolution￿ and privatization of services, it appears as if this is one public 
good that simply might be better provided at a more centralized level.  Particularly in 
areas prone to sleeping sickness epidemics, a real question can be asked why individuals 
in a community ought to provide the good, and why it shouldn￿t be an activity undertaken 
by the government (local and/or national).   
 
8.  CONCLUSION 
As noted above, because of the many possible outcomes, empirical data to 
baseline model parameters is really necessary.  Authors of this paper are currently 
involved in a large field project whose aim is to collect data with which to baseline such a 
model.   A number of empirical complications also need to be modeled.  For instance, a 
relatively straightforward extension could be made to allow for negative environmental 
impacts stemming from pour-ons or sprays, though these impacts are not yet fully 
understood let alone quantified (Kisamba-Mugerwe, personal communication).  The 
impact of drug resistance on current proportion of healthy animals can be included in a 
straightforward way, but obviously dynamic implications would require a dynamic 
model.   Though there is evidence of serious drug resistance in other countries, to date, 
there is little evidence of such resistance in southeast Uganda.  The potential for re-




included in the model; this too will vary across our study area and awaits empirical 
information.   
Despite these complications, however, the essential result of the paper is that a 
comparison across control measures must be made not only in terms of the breakdown 
between private and public benefits but also in terms of the incentive structure underlying 
the provision of each control method.  Those involved in tsetse and trypanosomosis 
control seem to overwhelmingly favor traps/targets because, without considering 
underlying individual incentive structures to cooperate or not cooperate over their 
provision, these appear to have the largest impact on prevalence with the lowest cost.  
Currently, it is fashionable to ascribe past failures with traps/targets to the lack of ￿true￿ 
community participation.   It is certainly true that, in the past, many veterinary health 
measures and projects were imposed from above with little input by communities who 
were then expected to adopt these measures.  Nonetheless, it is quite possible that the 
pure public goods nature of traps and targets, combined with an underlying incentive 
structure that may resemble a prisoner￿s dilemma, is not only an important part of the 
explanation for past failures, but it also indicates that future failures ￿ even with bottom-
up participatory approaches ￿ may not work either. 
Finally, while tsetse and trypanosomosis control has been the empirical focus of 
this paper, the theoretical model developed above should be of interest more generally.   
As national governments continue to devolve responsibility for provision of goods and 
services with large public goods aspects ￿ including pest management and vector-borne 
disease control ￿ the epidemiology-economic framework developed here can be applied 




household welfare.  Even without the epidemiology component, the economic framework 
for analyzing individual incentives for public goods provision ￿ including interactions 
among several choices characterized by interdependencies in production ￿ provides 
interesting insight into the provision decision, and may allow policymakers to better 
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APPENDIX 1--COMPARISON OF  NON-COOPERATIVE OUTCOME VS. 
SOCIAL OPTIMUM WHEN THE SYSTEM IS QUASI-CONCAVE 
 
The proof below shows that of 
SO NC
tt i tt i cm cm − − >  and 
SO NC
ii x x >  when the profit function is 
concave. 
 
It is easiest to re-write the social optimizer￿s problem as the following: 
() () () ( )
, max 1 * 1 * 0
i
OD i i H tt Tryp H tt i cm x i CM x k T T P CM k P CM R c CM Nc x    =+ − + − − − =    ∑  
 
We assume that the social optimizer choosesCM , and subsequently enforces purchase of 
CM
N
 by each producer, which is done to simplify the proof. 
 
To simplify notation, let  























First order conditions can then be re-written as: 
 
() () 11 *
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∑ ,  i ∀  
 
In appendix 1, we presented the Hessian for the four equation non-cooperative game, and 
so do not develop the same for the social optimum particularly because we are interested 
here in showing the results assuming that the Hessian is positive semi-definate.  First, we 
examine the cross-partials of the FOC￿s with respect to N: 
 
() () 11 *0
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which is also clearly greater than zero, as long as |H|>0.   
 
Since,  i R  is not a function of  j
ji
x
≠ ∑ , then these results hold when one expands to consider 
more than two players.   We note here that 
SO
i cm  may not increase with increases in N, 
given diminishing returns to the disease control production function.  However, 
SO NC CM CM > , so that 
SO NC
tt i tt i cm cm −− >  and 
SO NC







APPENDIX 2:  SECOND-ORDER CONDITIONS AND COMPARATIVE STATIS, 
2 PLAYERS  
 
Here, we derive second-order conditions for the simplest case for traps and 
targets, where the only impact is on mortality.   Similar results when we consider 
additional pure public goods impacts (e.g. on fly density), and when we consider control 
methods that yield private benefits, though the comparative statics are significantly more 
complex.  Below, we present results for the simplest case, additional proofs can be 
obtained from the authors upon request.   
Though we have a system of four equations and four variables,  2 1, − − tt tt cm cm , 
2 , 1 x x , because the public good is a pure public good, the Hessian, though negative semi-
definate, is equal to zero.  The pure public good￿s nature of the problem means that 
individual contributions are not well-defined, but rather only the total amount of the good 
provided.  As we show below, the system to be evaluated can be reduced to two 
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And similarly for player 2: 
 
 Given the pure public good nature of traps/targets,  



































































































































































.   
Finally, similarly to other two-input production functions, we assume that the 























































So H is indeed negative semi-definite.  The first and third rows are clearly linearly 
dependent, as are the second and fourth rows.  Since we only know the total amount of 
the good provided in equilibrium, we need only examine the changes in the individual￿s 
first-order conditions for a change in the total amount provided and his/her own choice of 
















Next, we consider changes costs of traps( ) tt c , costs of the animals () x c , the 
losses sustained when animals get sick ( ) Tryp k , and changes in parameters that increase 
the underlying disease prevalence, for instance the probability of a fly becoming infected 




prevalence in the absence of treatment) may differ across agro-ecologic zones and by 
types of tsetse flies, for instance. 







































== <  
 
And similarly, for a change in the cost of animals: 
2
1 0



































== <  
 
 
















































∂∂ ∂ ∂ +− −− ∂∂ ∂ ∂ == < = >
6447448 64 47 4 4 8
 
 
















∂ ∂∂ ∂ −− − −− ∂∂ ∂ ∂ == < = >
6447448 644 744 8
 
 
Thus, the number of animals increases unambiguously.  The impact on 
traps/targets is ambiguous; decreasing proportionate losses decreases the marginal 
benefits of traps/targets holding livestock constant, but increasing the number of livestock 
increasing benefits since the inputs are gross compliments. 
Finally, we consider a change in the underlying prevalence of the disease, for 
instance, a change in the probability that fly becomes infected after feeding on an 
infected cow, which is the parameter b from the epidemiological  model.  After some 
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∂∂ ∂∂ ∂∂−− + − −− ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ == < = >

























∂∂ ∂∂ ∂∂ −− + − −− ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ == < = >




In this case, the impact is ambiguous for both inputs.  The direct effect is to 
increase the marginal benefits from setting traps/targets and thus to increase traps/targets, 
though marginal benefits from animals decreases for a given level of traps/targets.  
If  












 .  In this 











APPENDIX 3--FUNCTIONAL FORMS AND PARAMETER VALUES USED IN 
THE SIMULATION MODEL 
 
The impact of control methods on tsetse mortality is modeled as an exponential 
function, and specified as follows: 
() 01 2
cm
cm k k uu c m c m
γ δ −− =+ +  
where u  is the tsetse mortality rate, k denotes the control methods that affect 
tsetse mortality (in our case, targets/traps and pour-ons),   0 u  is the baseline mortality rate 
that obtains when no control method is used,  and  , cm cm δ γ  are the parameters that 
determine the shape of the ￿increased mortality￿ production function.   All parameters are 
assumed to be positive.  Also, the same functional form is used for both traps/targets and 
pour-ons to capture the impact on mortality, though parameter values,  , cm cm δ γ , differ 
depending on the control method used. 
Similarly, the impact of the control method on fly densities is modeled as: 
() () 12 *1
cm
cm k k mm c m c m
ϖ λ −− =− +  
where m  is fly density, k denotes the control methods that affect fly density 
(targets/traps and pour-ons), m  is fly densities occurring in the absence of control 
measures, and  , cm cm λ ϖ  determine the shape of the m -production function. 
And: 
() () 12 *1
cm
cm k k rinv rinv cm cm




where rinv is duration of infection, k denotes the control methods that affect 
duration of infection (drugs), rinv is duration of infection in the absence of control 
measures, and  , cm cm τ ψ  determine the shape of the rinv-production function. 






















The value livestock production function is a simply quadratic, specified as 
follows: 
() () * ii i R Px x x αβ =− , where Pxis the price of livestock outputs, α ,β are 
productivity parameters.  When members share a common pasture, we simply use the 
following livestock production function: 
() () * ii i j R Px x x x αβ =− +  
Having defined the functional forms, the following equation is then maximized: 
( ) () () ( ) ()
,
*1 * 1 *
ki i
iO Di i H H i i c m x i
cm x
Max k T T P CM k P CM R x c cm c x π
−
  =+ − + − − −    
Or, for the social optimum, the social optimum 




ii i H H i i c m x i
cm x i
Max T T P CM k P CM R x c cm c x π
−
  =+ − + − −−   ∑  
For the scenarios depicted in the paper, we used the model of traps/targets, and 
assumed that the only impact occurred through tsetse mortality (no additional effect on 
fly densities).  We also fixed the number of animals, so that the only choice variable was 





20 T =   
.025 c =  
.25 a =  
.46 b =  
12.76 m =  
30 rinv =  
IMPACT OF CONTROL METHOD ON TSETSE MORTALITY PARAMETERS: 
  0 .02 u =  
 .51 cm γ =  
 .00425 cm δ =  
 ,0 cm cm λ ϖ =  
ECONOMIC PARAMETERS: 
8000 i R =  
.9 OD k =  
.75 Tryp k =  
5,10,20 tt c =  
For Scenarios 4-8, the epidemiological parameters are the same.  Remaining 
parameters are as follows: 
IMPACT OF CONTROL METHOD ON TSETSE MORTALITY PARAMETERS: 




 .7 cm γ =  
 .0015 cm δ =  
 ,0 cm cm λ ϖ =  
ECONOMIC PARAMETERS: 
8000 i R =  
.9 OD k =  
.75 Tryp k =  










i tt cm cm − − > , BUT 
SO NC
ii x x <=> , WHEN BOTH 
THE CONTROL METHOD AND LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION ARE SUBJECT 
TO EXTERNALITIES 
 
Recalling the maximization problem from the text in section 4, which considered 
traps and targets, and so dropped the notation for treated animals since no animals are 
treated -- the individuals￿ maximization problem is written as follows: 
() () ( ) () ( ) max 1 * , iO D H t t T r y p H t t l i i j C M t t i x i kP C M k P C M P x f x X c c m c x π − =+ − − −  








Similar to Appendix 1, we simplify notation by setting livestock output price  
equal to 1, and letting:  






















First-order conditions are as follows: 
() 1* 0
i
tryp CM i CM
tt













π ∂∂  =+ + − =  ∂∂ 
 [A31] 
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.. ( ) 1 Ht t stP CM ≤  
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i ∀  
Let  [A30]=
NC
cm FOC , [A31]=
NC
x FOC , [A32]=
SO
cm FOC , [A33]=
SO
x FOC .  Below we 
establish that 
SO NC cm cm >  as in the simpler case where there is no negative externality in 
livestock production, but that 
SO NC
ii x x <=> , whereas before, 
SO NC
ii x x >  
First consider the case where 
SO NC cm cm = , meaning that 
[ ] [ ]
SO NC




x FOC  at the same  i x , so 
NC SO
ii x x > .  Given 
the standard properties of the grazing production function characterized by negative 
externalities in use, this means that  ,,
NC NC NC SO SO SO
ii jii j
ji ji
x fx x xfx x
≠≠
  
<   





cm FOC , both because  ,,
NC NC NC SO SO SO
ii jii j
ji ji
x fx x xfx x
≠≠
  
<   
   ∑∑  and 
NC SO
cm cm MPM P <  evaluated at the same 
SO NC cm cm = .   Similarly 
SO cm  cannot be less than 
NC cm , since in this case, [ ] [ ]
SO NC




x FOC  -- even more so 
than before.  Again, this means that 
NC SO
ii x x >  and 
,,
NC NC NC SO SO SO
ii jii j
ji ji
x fx x xfx x
≠≠
  
<   
   ∑∑ .  Since 











more strongly than before; clearly this cannot hold for 
SO NC cm cm < .  For 
SO NC cm cm > , 
[ ] [ ]
SO NC
Hk S Hk S +> +, and there is some  ,
NC SO
ii x x  pair that equates 
NC
x FOC  and 
SO
x FOC  but it is possible for 
NC SO
ii x x <=> .  With 
NC SO
ii x x >  and thus 
,,
NC NC NC SO SO SO
ii jii j
ji ji
x fx x xfx x
≠≠
  
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∂∂ ∑  , which implies 
that  
SO cm  must be greater than 
NC cm .   With 
NC SO
ii x x =  and thus 
,,
NC NC NC SO SO SO
ii jii j
ji ji
x fx x xfx x
≠≠
  
=   







∂∂ ∑  which still requires 
SO cm  to 
be greater than 
NC cm .  Finally, it is also possible for 
SO NC cm cm >  and 
SO NC
ii x x > , since 
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at least possible for 
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